掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）  

This paper discusses rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE) in static games with unawareness that captures steady states of such games. We begin by defining the equilibrium concept in terms of its epistemic conditions. k-RSCE is a situation in which agents make rational choices and have correct beliefs about one another’s choices, and moreover these can be mutual belief to the k-th order. We then present an alternative definition that dispenses with these epistemic conditions and allows us to obtain equilibria through iterative eliminations of certain action profiles. In standard static games, k-RSCE reduces to Nash equilibrium, but not under unawareness. We examine the equilibrium concept’s properties and clarify its relationships with other equilibrium concepts for games with unawareness.

DOI： 10.1007/s00182-024-00907-1

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：学位論文（博士）  

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：SPRINGER  

A number of solution concepts of normal-form games have been proposed in the literature on subspaces of action profiles that have Nash type stability. While the literature mainly focuses on the minimal of such stable subspaces, this paper argues that non-minimal stable subspaces represent well the multi-agent situations to which neither Nash equilibrium nor rationalizability may be applied with satisfaction. As a theoretical support, the authors prove the optimal substructure of stable subspaces regarding the restriction of a game. It is further argued that the optimal substructure characterizes hierarchical diversity of coordination and interim phases in learning.

DOI： 10.1007/s11424-009-9147-9

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記述言語：英語   掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）   出版者・発行元：JOHN WILEY & SONS LTD  

The purpose of this paper is to examine dilemmas arising during the negotiation process where negotiators claim their positions and threats reciprocally. To obtain an holistic view of the dilemmas, we first define the class of negotiation we will focus on and then argue that inconsistency between the claims leads to dilemmas. Then, after we define and classify six dilemmas rigorously in terms of a dramatic model, we show that these six dilemmas are all and only dilemmas arising in negotiation. This is the main finding of the paper. A holistic description of the inter-relationships among the dilemmas is also presented. Copyright (c) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

DOI： 10.1002/sres.947

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掲載種別：研究論文（国際会議プロシーディングス）  

In this paper, we extend hypergame models by introducing mixed strategies and illustrate that the mixed extension enables us to deal with hypergames with cardinal utilities, while the literature has dealt only with hypergames with ordinal utilities. We then show some unique features of mixed-strategy equilibria of hypergames (hyper Nash equilibrium [4: Kijima, 1996]) and study the comparative statics of equilibria due to change in misperceptions about cardinal utilities. Finally, we examine these findings in the framework of inspection games [1: Avenhaus et al., 1996].

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：公益社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会  

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：公益社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会  

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会  

本稿では,経済学を中心としたサーベイに基づき,意思決定主体の心・認識や選択行動と合理的選択の対応付けにまつわる科学論を展開する.

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記述言語：日本語   出版者・発行元：社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会  

本論文は,従来の経済モデルで陽的には扱われてこなかった,組織の成員の内発的動機づけを考慮に入れた新たな経済モデルを作り,現実の組織マネジメント,特に成員の動機づけ管理への示唆を得ようというものである.より具体的な目的は,内発的動機づけをもった成員を想定したとき,この存在を効率よく動機づけ,良い成果を達成させるために,どのようにインセンティブを与えたらよいか,そして,内発的動機づけの向上のためにどれだけコスト(動機づけコスト)をかけたらよいかという問題を分析しようというものである.分析の結果,生産性の高さなどに応じた,業績給,動機づけコストの導入方法がわかった.

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記述言語：英語   会議種別：口頭発表（一般）  

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記述言語：英語   会議種別：口頭発表（一般）  

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種別：セミナー・ワークショップ

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